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1. Introduction 
 
Monetary policy implementation is one of the most significant areas of interaction between 
central banking and financial markets.  Historically, how this interaction takes place has been 
viewed as having an important impact on the ultimate objective of monetary policy, for example 
price stability or stimulating economic growth. In this article, we survey different approaches to 
monetary policy implementation.  We cover briefly some of the historical trends, but give 
particular attention to the practice that is now (again) very common world-wide; namely, 
targeting short term interest rates.  We discuss various ways this can be done and the implications 
for financial markets. We emphasize different European approaches, while also providing 
comparisons with the Fed. 
 
There are three main elements to monetary policy implementation: 
 
• The first element is the operational target, which is an economic variable, for example 
the overnight interbank interest rate that the central bank aims to control on a day-by-day 
basis through its monetary policy instruments. The target level is decided upon by the 
central bank’s monetary policy decision making committee.  The announced target level 
provides guidance to the central bank’s implementation officers and also serves to 
communicate the stance of monetary policy to the public.  
 
• The second element is the operational framework for controlling the target. This specifies 
the monetary policy instrument and how they are to be used.  These instruments typically 
consist of standing facilities, open market operations, and reserve requirements.3 
Additional elements of the operational framework are, for example, the list of 
counterparties eligible for central bank repos and the list of eligible collateral in these. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in Financial Markets and Institutions: A European Perspective, Oxford University Press. 
 
2 U. Bindseil: European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, ulrich.bindseil@ecb.int; 
K. Nyborg: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, 
Norway, kjell.nyborg@nhh.no. We are indebted to a number of persons at central banks who helped us 
completing the survey tables on current operating procedures, namely Johan Arvidsson, Roger Clews, 
Spence Hilton, Thomas Jordan, Lars Risbjerg, Yulia Snizhkova, Flemming Würtz, Siri Valseth. We also 
wish to thank Philip Hartmann (the editor) for useful suggestions. Of course, responsibility for any 
remaining errors remains exclusively with the authors. The views presented in this paper are the views of 
the authors, and not those of the European Central Bank.    
3 The term “instrument” has also been used to designate operational and intermediate targets, see e.g. Poole 
(1970). 
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• The third element is the day-to-day use of open market operations within this framework, 
also called central bank liquidity management. An important aspect of liquidity 
management is forecasting the so-called autonomous liquidity factors, e.g. banknotes in 
circulation and government deposits with the central bank, and mapping them, together 
with other relevant information, into open market operations volumes in a way that is 
consistent with the operational target level.  The required precision of liquidity 
management, and thus the quality of autonomous factor forecasts and the frequency of 
open market operations, depends on the operational framework of monetary policy 
implementation.      
 
As an example, consider briefly the case of the European Central Bank (ECB), whose operational 
target is the overnight interest rate. Rather than announcing a specific target rate, the ECB 
announces the minimum bid rate at which it conducts its weekly reverse open market operations. 
The ECB ensures that overnight market rates are close to this minimum bid rate by acting on the 
demand and supply conditions of the deposits of banks with the Eurosystem.4 To do this, the ECB 
has at its disposal three main instruments. (i) Weekly open market operations with one week 
maturity through which the bulk of funds is provided to the market (in 2004 on average EUR 250 
billion). (ii) Two standing facilities with overnight maturity, namely a borrowing facility at which 
banks can always borrow funds against collateral, and a deposit facility at which banks can 
always deposit excess funds. Both facilities are offered by the ECB at a penalty rate of 100 basis 
points relative to the target rate, and average daily recourse to the facilities is thus rather low (in 
2004 each below EUR 0.5 billion). (iii) Reserve requirements of on average EUR 140 billion in 
2004 which impose a structural element on the demand for reserves. By using these instruments, 
and by devoting resources to forecasting autonomous factors, the ECB typically achieves a high 
degree of control of short term interest rates.  For example, in 2004 the ECB’s implicit target rate, 
the minimum bid rate in its weekly repo operations, was constantly 2.00%, while the average 
overnight rate (EONIA) was 2.05%. The standard deviation of the difference between the 
overnight rate and the minimum bid rate was 9 basis points, while the standard deviation of first 
differences in the overnight rate was 10 basis points. 
 
There are many other ways to implement monetary policy, including controlling short term rates, 
as noted by Borio (2001):5
 
Just as there are a hundred ways to skin a cat, so there are a hundred ways to implement 
monetary policy. These may differ considerably in terms of the interest rates that are the 
focus of policy, the range of instruments employed, the frequency of operations, the 
spectrum of counterparties and other technical elements. Such differences reflect a 
mixture of purely historical factors and different views regarding the fine balance 
between the pros and cons of the various choices. At the end of the day, however, the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating. The “eating” here is the central bank’s ability to 
convey its policy signals with the desired degree of clarity and its ability to influence 
short-term rates with the desired degree of accuracy. 
 
                                                 
4 The ECB and the NCBs participating to the euro collectively constitute the Eurosystem. The ECB is 
responsible for setting the policy rates and for the decisions relating to the conduct of monetary policy 
operations, but national central banks (NCBs) participating to the euro are involved as well, as banks have 
their accounts with the NCBs and also submit bids for repo auctions with NCBs, not with the ECB.    
5 For a comprehensive technical survey of monetary policy implementation techniques of industrialised 
countries see Borio (1997). For a survey of implementation issues in countries with less developed markets 
see IMF (2004). 
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Borio suggests that from a monetary policy perspective, it is doubtful that the implementation 
details are very important as long as the signaling and the short term rate objectives are achieved.  
But these are relatively straightforward to meet. Signalling can take the form of publicly 
announcing the target level.  Controlling short term rates can be done for instance by pegging the 
market rate to a standing facility rate.   
 
However, monetary policy implementation arguably has ramifications and implications beyond 
the pure monetary policy perspective, for example on financial markets.  As shown by Hamilton 
(1996) and Perez-Quiros and Rodriguez-Mendizábal (2006), the volatility of short term rates is 
influenced by how monetary policy is implemented.  Given the ease with which short term rates 
can be controlled, one may wonder why central banks often choose frameworks that admit 
volatility in short term rates.  In this paper, we discuss how the choice of the operational 
framework may also affect other aspects of financial markets, such as the liquidity of interbank 
credit markets and the market for collateral. If we accept the view that short term rates is the 
appropriate operational target, we would argue that optimal monetary policy implementation may 
be less an issue of the  efficient transmission of monetary policy and more an issue of financial 
market efficiency. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the concept of the operational 
target of monetary policy and provides an overview of the historical debate and today’s central 
bank practice in this regard. Section 3 discusses the three main instruments of monetary policy 
implementation in the context of the central bank balance sheet.  Section 4 relates balance sheet 
quantities to short term interbank rates and explains how the central bank can control rates. 
Section 5 discusses how alternative approaches to monetary policy implementation affect 
financial markets. Section 6 discusses different methods for conducting open market operations.  
Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. The operational target of monetary policy  
 
Today, most central banks use short term rates as their operational target. But this has not always 
been so.  In this section, we discuss the rational behind targeting short term rates.  We also put the 
view that short term rates is the appropriate operational target in a historical context by discussing 
the emergence after WW1 and eventual abandonment of the alternative policy of targeting the 
monetary base. 
  
2.1 The short term interest rate 
 
Prior to 1914, monetary policy meant first of all controlling  short term interest rates, mainly via 
the use of standing facilities (see in particular the surveys of the Bank of England’s monetary 
policy implementation in the 19th century as provided by Bagehot (1873) and King (1936), or for 
Germany, Reichsbank 1900). The theoretical foundations of this approach may be traced back to 
Thornton (1802) and Wicksell (1898). Wicksell (1936: 102) established the concept of the 
“natural rate” of interest, which he described as follows: 
 
“There is a certain rate of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity 
prices, and tends neither to raise nor to lower them. This is necessarily the same as the 
rate of interest which would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made 
of money and all lending were effected in the form of real capital goods. It comes to 
much the same thing to describe it as the current value of the natural rate of interest on 
capital.” 
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That under stable prices, the rate of interest on money has to correspond to the real rate of 
interest, which can be thought to be independent of the “monetary sphere” of the economy, is 
implied by simple arbitrage logic. Today, “neo-Wicksellians,” e.g. Woodford (2003), again 
incorporate this insight as a key building block in their macroeconomic models.  
 
But why focus on the overnight interest rate, and not on a longer term rate, e.g., the 1-, 3-, or 12 
month rates? It could be argued that the latter rates are more relevant for monetary policy 
transmission, as they are the basis of more important decisions.  So why not target them directly?  
The main problem with targeting longer term rates is the irregularities this may lead to in shorter 
term rates.  Consider as an example the case of a central bank that targets the 90 day rate.  
Assume for simplicity that the central bank is predictable in its changes of interest rate targets, 
and that it achieves market rates at its target level with a high degree of precision. Concretely, 
assume that on day τ, the central bank is expected to reduce its 90 day target rate from 5% to 4%. 
What does this imply for the overnight rate around day τ, if the expectations hypothesis of the 
term structure of interest rate holds? The 90-days horizon on τ-1 and on τ overlap by 89 days. 
The expectations hypothesis, in its simplified linear form, tells us that  
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Where  are the 90-day and overnight interest rates on day t and t+j, respectively. 
Thus, the difference in the 90 days rate between τ-1 and τ has to be translated in terms of 
overnight rates exclusively into the overnight rates on day τ-1 and τ+89, such that 
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extreme upward spike is, in a sense, anomalous, particularly since the overall level of rates is 
being lowered.  This volatility in the overnight rate is arguably undesirable, for example because 
of  the importance of the overnight market.  It is at this maturity that most unexpected short term 
liquidity fluctuations are corrected. The average daily volume of interbank overnight lending of 
52 panel banks in the euro area is around EUR 40 billion.  
%941,1 =−τi
In contrast, if a predictable central bank targets an overnight rate of 5% until τ-1, and then moves 
its target on τ to 4%, the 90 days rate will simply have moved on τ-89 from 5% to approximately 
4.99% and will decrease by approximately 1 basis point per day until the change occurs. 
Therefore, the adaptation of longer term rates takes place in the smoothest possible way if the 
overnight rate is changed in a predictable way. If the central bank would like to see an earlier 
decline in the 90 days rates, it simply needs to cut its overnight rate earlier (which under the 
assumption of predictability, triggers a correspondingly earlier start of the decline of the 90 days 
rate).  
 
While it is today again generally accepted by central bankers and academics that monetary policy 
implementation means controlling short term interest rates, from around 1920 to the mid 1980s, 
“reserve position doctrine” (Meigs 1962) was the dominating view on monetary policy 
implementation, particularly in the U.S.  According to this doctrine, a central bank should, via 
open market operation, steer some reserve concept, which would impact via the money multiplier 
on monetary aggregates and the ultimate goals of monetary policy. Although this view is now out 
of fashion, many monetary policy textbooks still devote substantial attention to concepts, such as 
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the money multiplier and the monetary base, which  make sense primarily in a reserve position 
doctrine framework.   
 
2.2Interest rate targeting in Europe and the US 
 
While there is a high degree of consensus today regarding the targeting of short term rates, there 
is substantial variation with respect to how this is done. This also means that the volatility of short 
term rates varies substantially across currency areas.  Table 1 sets out some of these differences 
across several central banks in Europe as well as the U.S.  The selected central banks represent 
the former western Europe – the ECB/Eurosystem, the Bank of England, the Swiss National 
Bank, and the three Scandinavian central banks – as well as those of the U.S., Russia, and 
Belarus. This sample will be used throughout this article.6  
 
 
Definition and explicitness of target rate 
Although all the central banks in our sample target a short term rate, typically the overnight rate, 
they vary with the degree of explicitness with which they do so.  In the first column in Table 1, 
we denote central banks that specify the target explicitly by “explicit” and central banks that are 
less explicit, for instance by specifying only the rate at which they operate in the money market, 
“implicit”.  Announcing a rate at which to operate in the money market is also a commitment to 
provide central bank funds to maintain market rates close to the operations rate, since otherwise 
some arbitrage condition would be violated and markets would be in disorder. In all cases, 
changes in the target level are announced right after the meetings of the decision making 
committee. This improves transparency relative to the old technique of letting the market guess 
the target level from the central bank’s operations.  It also sharpens the focus of the markets on 
the target level. 
  
 
Precision of control of the overnight interest rate 
The second column in Table 1 presents the volatility of the overnight rates in our sample of 
currency areas in the period 2000-2004.7 Among the western currency areas, the UK is the 
highest, with a volatility of 44 basis points (bp) per day.  The US is lowest in terms of overnight 
rate volatility (with 4 bps), while the Swiss National Bank (SNB) reaches an even lower level for 
its target rate, the 3 month Libor (1.3 bp; the SNB is the only central bank in our sample that 
targets a maturity of interbank rates above one day).  Haldane, Ayuso, and Restoy (1997) have 
shown that central banks implement monetary policy such that short term interest rate deviations 
from the target rates tend to be non-persistent, and therefore do normally not imply volatility of 
medium- and long term rates. It would therefore be wrong to conclude from the overnight 
volatility figures that monetary policy transmission in the UK is less precise than in the US.  
 
Frequency of potential changes of the interest rate target and size of changes 
The third column in Table 3 show the frequency with which the different central banks’ decision 
making bodies meet, for the purpose of assessing the target level.  For example, the ECB’s 
                                                 
6 The monetary policy implementation techniques of these central banks are described for instance in the 
following documents. Danmark: Danmark’s Nationalbank (2003a), (2003b); ECB: European Central Bank 
(2004a) and European Central Bank (2005); Norway: Kran and Ovre (2001); Sweden: Otz (2005); 
Switzerland: Jordan and Kugler (2004), Jordan (2005); UK: Bank of England (2002), (2004); Clews 
(2005); US: Meulendyke (1998), Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2005). Also Websites of central 
bank tend to provide some up-to date information on monetary policy implementation techniques.  
7 This is measured as the standard deviation of first differences. 
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Governing Council currently meets only once a month for this purpose (until 2000, it met every 
fortnight). The Fed’s FOMC meets every eighth week. The other central banks in our sample are 
within this range.  
 
The frequency of meetings does not appear to be very correlated with the number of actual 
changes: while the Fed changed rates 21 times since 2000 which is the record amongst western 
hemisphere central banks, the ECB changed its rates only 13 times (see column 4).  The 
frequency of actual changes could be related to the size of changes to the target level. However, 
there is not much variation across central banks here. These changes are mostly 25 bp or 50 bp 
(column 6). No central bank did a smaller rate change, while three implemented higher ones, 
namely Switzerland (75 bp), Norway (100 bp), and Belarus (2500 bp).  
 
Gradual or exhaustive changes of the interest rate target level 
On this issue, the Bank of England and the Fed appear to present two very different approaches. 
Goodhart (2000) suggests that the target adjustments of the Bank of England would be such as to 
generate a martingale in the target rates:8 “When I was a member of the MPC I thought I was 
trying, at each forecast round, to set the level of interest rates, on each occasion, so that without 
the need for future rate changes, prospective (forecast) inflation would on average equal the 
target at the policy horizon.”  Under such an approach, it should, after each change, be equally 
likely that target rates go up or down with the next change, regardless of the direction of the 
current change. The Fed in contrast has for a long time followed a gradual approach in adjusting 
target rates to changing economic conditions, creating auto-correlation of changes of target rates 
(see e.g. Rudebusch 2002). Since 1999, the Fed also has been hinting explicitly in its 
announcements of decisions on the direction and speed of future changes. Interpreting these 
verbal hints has become an important element of Fed watching.  Despite the rhetoric, we see in 
Column 5 that the Bank of England and the Fed typically change target rates in a gradual way; 
only 13% and 10%, respectively, of rate changes represent a change in direction.  
 
Column 5 of Table 1 indicates that in the period 2000-2004, the central banks with the most 
gradualist approach has been the US Fed (21 changes with 2 changes of direction) and the ECB 
and Denmark (both 13 changes with only one change of direction), while Sweden having done 
least changes with most changes in direction (3) seems to be the one taking the most exhaustive 
steps.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The latter question is not to be confounded with the one of whether the actual overnight rate follows a 
martingale within the reserve maintenance period.  
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Table 1: Specification of operational targets and technique of changing level of target variable 
for selected central banks  
 
 1. 
Type of operational target and 
description (“implicit” = through 
operations rate; “explicit” = 
explicit reference to targeted 
market rate) 
2. 
Vol. of 
daily 
changes 
of ONR in 
bp. (2004)
3. 
Normal 
frequency 
of 
reconsider
ation 
4. 
Number 
of 
changes 
of target 
rate 
(2000-04)
5. 
% of which 
are changes 
in direction 
(total 
number) 
6. 
Min/max 
change in 
basis 
points 
Euro area implicit – minimum bid rate in 
weekly repos 
10 Once a 
month 
13 8%     (1) 25/50 
UK implicit  - Rate of fixed rate repo 
operations 
22 Once a 
month 
16 13%    (2) 25/50 
Sweden implicit  - Rate of weekly fixed 
rate repo operations 
19 Eight 
times a 
year 
13 23%   (3) 25/50 
Denmark implicit – “Discount rate” which is 
he main policy rate, without direct 
relation to market rates; „lending 
rate“ fixed tender rate around 
which overnight rates fluctuate (at 
currently 15 bp above discount 
rate) 
10 Once a 
month 
13 8%    (1) 25/50 
Norway implicit - Deposit rate 16 Every six 
weeks 
16 13%  (2) 25/100 
Switzer-
land 
explicit - Target range for the 
three-month Libor for Swiss 
Francs. This target range extends 
over one percentage point. 
Normally, the SNB keeps the rate 
in the middle of the target range. 
 
1.3* Quarterly 12 17%  (2) 25/75 
Belarus The refinancing rate is an 
administrative rate which is largely 
adopted by the financial sector as a 
reference rate. Policies for steering 
the overnight rate to this are under 
development. 
- Once a 
month 
44 7%    (3) 100/2500 
Russia. The main target is the appreciation 
of real exchange rate of ruble – set 
annually. Shorter-term targets are 
not disclosed to public 
- - - - - 
US explicit - Overnight interest rate 
(federal funds rate) 
5 8 weeks 21 10%  (2) 25/50 
* In the case of Switzerland, the target rate is the three month Libor, and not the overnight rate 
 
 
 
 
3. The central bank balance sheet and the three main instruments of monetary 
policy implementation 
 
The central bank balance sheet is the starting point for understanding monetary policy 
implementation. The items in the central bank balance sheet fall into three distinct categories; 
autonomous factors, monetary policy operations, and reserves of banks, as illustrated in Table 2.  
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Table 2: The central bank balance sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Autonomous factors 
Foreign reserves Banknotes in circulation 
Investment assets Government deposits 
… Capital and reserves 
 … 
Monetary policy operations 
Reverse open market operations*  
Outright holdings of securities*  
  
Borrowing  facility  Deposit facility 
 Reserves of banks (including those to fulfil required reserves) 
  
*It is assumed that that open market operations supply, rather than remove, liquidity, as is the case in the Euro area and 
the US. Whether open market operations supply or remove liquidity depends on the size of autonomous factors and 
reserve requirements. In our sample, the central banks of Norway, Denmark, Belarus and Russia have to absorb 
liquidity through open market operations, mainly due to their large foreign reserves position. 
 
 
 
3.1 Autonomous liquidity factors 
Autonomous factors are items which are not controlled by the monetary policy function of the 
central bank, such as banknotes in circulation, foreign exchange reserves, government current 
accounts, holdings of securities for investment purposes, and possibly others. Transactions 
affecting these items normally include a leg in the domestic currency and therefore affect the 
reserves of banks with the central bank. For central banks like the ECB that supply funds through 
open market operations, it is therefore important to forecast the autonomous factors accurately. 
Failure to do so may lead the short term rate to deviate from its target.  The weekly frequency of 
operations in the euro area means that autonomous factor forecasts over a one week horizon are 
particularly important.  
 
Consider as one example of an autonomous factor banknotes in circulation, which is typically one 
of the largest if not the largest single item in the central bank balance sheet. The amount of euro 
banknotes, displayed below, exhibits weekly, monthly and seasonal patterns. These patterns 
reflect regularities such as withdrawing of cash before the weekend, the payment of salaries, the 
summer holiday season, and Christmas shopping. The forecasting model for banknotes applied by 
the European Central Bank in its day-to-day forecasting is discussed in more detail in Cabrero et 
al (2002). 
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Figure 1 :Banknotes of the Eurosystem, January 2004 – May 2005, in billions of euro 
Source: European Central Bank 
 
The Eurosystem produces separate forecasts for all the main autonomous factors. The following 
table provides, for the second semester of 2002, the accumulated volatility of the main 
autonomous factors as well as the forecasting errors over three different time horizons. As a 
fraction of volatility, forecast errors are the smallest for the most volatile series, banknotes and 
government deposits. This reflects the larger amount of resources devoted to the forecasting of 
these two key autonomous factors. 
 
Table 3: Autonomous liquidity factors in the euro area, second half of 2002, standard 
deviations of changes and of forecast errors at three different forecasting horizons, in 
billion of EUR (source: European Central Bank) 
 Forecast horizon 
Horizon: 
Absolute size9 
(end  2002) One day Five days Ten days 
Banknotes 377 1.1 / 0.2 4.1 / 1.4 7.8/2.8 
Government deposits 50 4.5 / 0.4 10.0 / 2.0 12.0 / 3.4 
Net foreign assets 380 0.4 / 0.1 0.8 / 0.4 11.4 / 0.9 
Domestic financial assets  120 0.4 / 0.2 0.8 / 0.6 1.3 / 1.0 
 
 
 
3.2 Open market operations 
Open market operations are monetary policy operations conducted at the initiative of the central 
bank in order to affect the level of reserves of banks with the central bank, and thereby achieve 
the operational target of monetary policy. They may consist of reverse operations (i.e. repos or 
reverse repos) or outright purchases or sales of securities. Today, day-to-day monetary policy 
implementation is done almost exclusively through repos, while outright holdings of securities 
                                                 
9 Note that the length of the Eurosystem balance sheet at end 2002 was EUR 832 billion.  
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are used by some central banks as a means of structural liquidity supply. Section 5 will elaborate 
in more detail on the choice between repos and outright operations for the structural supply of 
liquidity to the market.  
Both Keynes (1930) and Milton Friedman (1982), as advocates of the reserve position doctrine, 
argued that open market operations, which they conceived to be outright operations in securities,  
would be the supreme instrument of monetary policy implementation, if not the only one really 
needed. Today, with the dominance of reverse operations, the distinction between open market 
operations and standing facilities has become more blurred, and the idea to operate without 
standing facilities is no longer considered. Section 6 looks at the details of repo operations using 
fixed rate tenders and auctions, especially in the context of the ECB.  
Table 4 surveys current practice of repo operations for our sample of central banks.  The standard 
frequency of the main refinancing operations in Europe is one to two weeks.  The maturity of 
these operations tends to be one week (columns 1 and 2). In terms of tender procedure, the fixed 
rate tender seems to dominate in Europe with the exception of the euro are (column 3).  Like the 
ECB, the Fed also uses variable rate tenders (discriminatory auctions). Most central banks 
conduct more than one type of reverse operations (column 4), and the number of outstanding 
operations at any moment in time is mostly in the order of 2 to 4 (column 5).     
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Table 4: Use of reverse open market operations by selected central banks 
 1. 
Frequency of 
reverse 
operations 
2. 
Maturity of 
main 
operation 
3. 
Tender 
procedure 
4. 
Other open market operations 
5. 
Average 
number of 
operations 
outstanding 
Euro area weekly One week Variable rate 
tender with 
minimum bid 
rate 
Longer term refinancing 
operations: monthly variable rate 
tenders with pre-announced 
volume and three months 
maturity; Fine tuning overnight 
operations: n in 2004  
4 
UK 
(new*) 
Weekly One week Fixed rate Overnight operation on last day 
of the reserve maintenance period 
 
Sweden Weekly One week Fixed rate 
tender 
Daily fine-tuning operations 2 
Denmark Two weekly 
operations in 
parallel: one 
liquidity 
absorbing,  
one providing 
Two weeks Fixed rate 
tender with 
full allotment 
(at lending 
rate) 
- 4 
Norway No standard 
frequency 
Varying, 
up to 10 
days 
Variable rate 
tender 
Collection of fixed term deposits 
(rarely) 
Few, 
sometimes 
none 
Switz. Daily Mainly one 
week (also 
overnight, 
two weeks)
Fixed rate 
tender 
(rationing if 
demand > 
supply) 
Fine tuning operations, etc. 5 
Belarus Weekly Varying 
(up to one 
month) 
Variable rate 
tender with 
max or min 
bid rates 
Issuance of central bank debt 
instruments to absorb liquidity 
N/A 
Russia overnight 
repo;  
3 month 
repo;  
1 or 2 week 
repo   
twice a 
day;  
once a 
month; 
once a 
week 
Variable rate 
tender with 
minimum bid 
rate 
Issuance of Central bank’s bonds, 
deposit auctions and reverse repo 
at various maturities (to absorb 
liquidity) 
N/A 
US  Almost daily Overnight 
(192 in 
2004) and 
two weeks 
Variable rate Other maturities up to 28 days Around 3 
* The Bank of England is currently in a process of changing its monetary policy implementation technique 
(see Bank of England 2004). This and the following tables describe the new framework, as it will be 
implemented towards the start of 2006. 
 
3.3 Standing facilities 
Standing facilities are, in contrast to open market operations, monetary policy operations 
conducted at the initiative of the commercial banks, under the conditions specified by the central 
banks. Historically, they were only liquidity providing and were either a discount or a lombard 
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(advance) facility. In a discount, the counterparty sells short term paper to the central bank, but 
receives only a part of the nominal value of the asset, since the nominal value of the paper is 
“discounted” at the prevailing discount rate. The maturity of a discount hence depends on the 
maturity of the discounted paper. In a lombard loan, the counterpart in contrast obtains 
collateralised credit of a standardised maturity, today usually overnight.  We will refer to a 
liquidity providing standing facilities as a “borrowing facility”, taking the perspective of the 
central bank’s counterparty.10 Practically all borrowing facilities today are lombard facilities. 
More recently, some central banks, e.g. the ECB, have introduced a liquidity absorbing facility 
(“deposit facility”). The deposit facility enables counterparties to place their end-of-day surplus 
liquidity with the central bank on a remunerated account.  
The rates of the standing facilities are often fixed by the central bank at a “penalty level”, i.e. 
such that the use of the facilities is normally not attractive relative to market rates. The interest 
rates on the two facilities then forms the ceiling and the floor of a corridor within which short-
term money market rates move. Such a corridor system is applied by the Bank of England, the 
ECB, and the central banks of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand among others. A symmetric 
corridor has the important advantage, relative to an asymmetric approach a la Fed, in that it 
creates a general symmetry of the liquidity management problems of the central banks and the 
commercial banks. This symmetry allows for instance to ignore higher order moments of 
autonomous factor shocks (Bindseil 2004).11
Systems in which standing facilities are not set at penalty levels were standard until the first half 
of the 20th century, and are still applied in some cases today. Section 5 discusses some advantages 
and disadvantages of different approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The ECB calls its liquidity providing facility the marginal lending facility. The Fed calls its facility the 
discount facility, although it is strictly speaking a lombard facility.  
11 An interesting study on how standing facilities may be misused by banks to manipulate the money 
market is Ewerhart et al (2007). 
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 Table 5: Use of standing facilities for selected central banks 
 1. 
Borrowing 
facility 
2. 
Deposit 
facility 
3. 
At penalty 
level? 
4. 
Width of the corridor set by standing facilities 
Euro area Yes Yes Yes +/- 100 basis points around the target level for 
short term rates 
UK (new) Yes Yes Yes Rates on standing facilities will be the MPC’s 
repo rate +/-25 basis points on the final day of the 
maintenance period, and wider on all other days 
Sweden Yes Yes Yes +/- 75 basis points 
Denmark none Remuner. of 
current 
accounts at 
discount rate 
– but only up 
to ceiling 
Light 
penalty 
level (only 
15 basis 
points) 
If one considers Danmarks Nationalbank’s full 
allotment fixed rate open market operations as 
standing facilities, one could stipulate a corridor 
of 15 basis points. However, open market 
operations are only weekly, so there is no 
effective upper bound to the overnight rate.  
Norway Yes Yes Borrowing 
facility yes, 
deposit 
facility no 
200 basis points. Note: access to the deposit 
facility is automatic in the sense that any deposits 
on the sight accounts of banks with the central 
banks are remunerated at the deposit facility rate.  
Switzerl. Yes No Yes Borrowing facility is 200 basis points above the 
overnight rate (the call money rate) 
Belarus Yes Yes Mostly Mid 2005: 15%, asymmetric around policy rate. 
Deposit facility=3%, refinancing rate=13%, and 
lending facility=18%. 
Russia Yes (collat. 
borrowing  at 
7 days and 
overnight) 
Yes 
 
Yes Mid 2005: Overnight borrowing rate at 13%; 
overnight deposit rate at 0.5%; 1% for one-week 
deposits. Market rates fluctuate in between. 
US  Yes No Yes Borrowing facility 100 basis points above the 
target level for short term rates 
 
 
3.4 Reserves of banks with the central bank and reserve requirements  
This is arguably the most important single item on the balance, since reserves represent the good 
for which the short term market interest rate is the price. Most central banks today impose reserve 
requirements, including the Fed and the ECB. Banks that do not fulfil reserve requirements face 
penalties; in the case of the ECB, it is equal to the borrowing facility rate plus 250 basis points.  
The justification for imposing reserve requirements has evolved considerably (see for instance 
Goodfriend and Hargraves, 1983, or Bindseil, 2004, Chapter 6). Today, there is consensus that 
the main purpose of reserve requirements lies in facilitating the control of short-term interest 
rates. This stabilizing effect works in two ways. First, if reserve requirements are set above the 
demand for working balances, which fluctuate from day to day, they stabilize the demand for 
reserves. Second, if reserve requirements are to be held only on average over a reserve 
maintenance period, they provide a buffer against transitory autonomous factor shocks. For 
instance the ECB can only achieve a high degree of interest rate stability with a weekly frequency 
of open market operations because of a combination of relatively high reserve requirements and 
the fact that these have to be maintained only on average over the one month reserve maintenance 
period. This being said, reserve requirements are not strictly necessary to control very precisely 
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short term interest rates. Control can also be achieved through daily open market operations or 
standing facilities to which recourse is systematic and the rate of which is at the level of the 
operational target (as under the Norwegian and Reichsbank approaches, as they will be called in 
section 5). 
While in the 1990s, many authors predicted the disappearance of reserve requirements, recent 
years have witnessed some innovations which have raised their popularity, in particular with 
banks. These innovations go into the direction of taking away the taxation character of reserves. 
The ECB was, after de Nederlandsche Bank, the second to introduce reserve requirements 
remunerated at market rates (in 1999). The Fed has added to its reserve requirement a voluntary 
(“contractual”) component. This voluntary component is remunerated at market rates, and can be 
chosen by the banks (within certain limits) before the start of the maintenance period.  At end 
2004, the total requirements (including the voluntary component) stood at USD 20 billion 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2005). The Bank of England, which has long been a strong 
opponent of traditional reserve requirements, is currently in the process of introducing voluntary 
reserves with averaging. Under its new scheme, “banks will choose a target level of positive 
balances (voluntary reserves) that they will be required to hold with the Bank on average over a 
maintenance period lasting from one MPC meeting to the next. Reserve holdings will be 
remunerated at the Bank’s repo rate (with ceilings on the amount each scheme-member bank can 
hold)” (Bank of England 2004). 
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Table 6 provides a survey of features of reserve requirements in those countries of our sample 
that have some kind of reserve requirement system 
 
Table 6: Main features of reserve requirement systems – missing central bank are those without 
any reserve requirement system   
 1. 
Reserve base 
categories; reserve 
ratio 
2. 
Size of reserve 
requirements 
3. 
Remuneration 
4. 
Averaging 
period 
5. 
Level available 
for averaging 
Euro area 2% of deposits and 
debt securities with 
maturity up to two 
years 
EUR 140 billion At rates of 
Eurosystem’s 
main refinancing 
operations. 
Approximately 
one month.  
Exact time 
depends on 
meetings of ECB 
Governing 
Council 
Equivalent to 
reserve 
requirements 
UK (new) Banks choose 
themselves their 
reserve 
requirements up to a 
certain maximum 
Targets for 
reserve balances 
may total GBP 25 
billion (Clews, 
2005, p. 215) 
Remunerated at 
BoE repo rate 
Between MPC 
meetings, i.e. 
one month 
Equivalent to 
level chosen by 
banks 
Switz. 2.5% of  liabilities 
with a maturity of 90 
days;  2.5% of 20% of 
liabilities in the form 
of savings deposits 
CHF 7.5 billion None One month, from 
the 20th to the 
19th of the 
following month 
Around CHF 5 
billion12
Belarus 5% of all deposits 
from household 
denominated in 
BYR; 10% of all 
deposit from firms 
denominated in 
BYR; 10% of all FX 
deposits  
BYR 465 billion 
(about USD 200 
million) 
None One month, 
starting on 15th 
calendar day 
and ending on 
14th calendar 
day. 
20% of reserve 
requirements on 
liabilities 
denominated in 
BYR. 
Russia 2% for liabilities to 
non-residents and 
3,5% for all the 
others 
135 billion rubles 
(about USD 4,5 
billion)  
None 1 month 20% of total 
US  Different marginal 
levels, max. 10% of 
transactions deposits 
After deduction of 
vault cash USD 
10 billion  
None (but at 
market rates for 
“clearing 
balance 
requirements) 
Two weeks 
starting on a 
Thursday 
Around USD 20 
billion (of which 
EUR 10 billion is 
clearing balance 
requirement) 
 
 
 
3.5 The demand and supply for reserves 
The balance sheet identity (assets = liabilities) allow us to present one balance sheet item as a 
residual, for example the net recourse to the standing facilities. Letting B and D denote recourse 
                                                 
12 In Switzerland, banks are allowed to use vault cash to fulfil their reserve requirements. This reduces the 
need to hold reserves in the form of deposits with the central bank. Currently, vault cash held by banks 
amounts to 4.5 billion CHF. 
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to the borrowing and deposit facilities, respectively, we have, over the course of the reserve 
maintenance period, if we assume that there are no excess reserves: 
 
net use of standing facilities  (B-D) = - open market operations (M) 
 + required reserves  (RR) 
 +net autonomous factors   (A). 
 
 
We see that there is a net use of the standing facilities whenever open market operations do not 
equal reserve requirements plus autonomous factors.  We say that the banking sector is long 
(short) reserves in aggregate if, M  –  A - RR > 0  (M – A – R < 0).  In a system that penalizes 
users of the standing facilities, as is the case in the euro area, an efficient  interbank market 
implies that standing facilities are used only when the banking sector is strictly long or short 
reserves over the monthly reserve maintenance period. In this case, short term rates at the end of 
the maintenance period are determined by whether or not the banking sector is short or long 
reserves.  If it is long, short term rates are determined by the deposit facility.  If it is short, rates 
are determined by the borrowing facility. Because the autonomous factors are stochastic, this 
means that short term rates at the end of the maintenance period will also be stochastic.  Rates 
prior to the end of maintenance period will then be given by the relative likelihood of the banking 
sector being long or short reserves at the end of the period.  In the next section, we discuss a 
model that captures this idea and show how standing facilities and open market operations can be 
used to steer short term rates. 
 
4. A basic model of short term interest rate control and the “liquidity effect” 
Models of the relationship between available reserves and interest rates and how this relationship 
is to be used by the central bank start with Poole (1968). In section 4.1, we will provide a simple 
microeconomic model following the specification of Woodford (2001). In section 4.2, the even 
simpler aggregate model will be presented which is also suitable for modeling reserve 
maintenance periods with more than one day.  
 
 
4.1 The one day “individual shocks” model of Woodford (2001) 
 
In this model, banks must end each day with nonnegative reserve positions. That is, negative 
positions must be made up by using the borrowing facility.  A bank with positive holdings can 
use the deposit facility. Within the day, the timeline is as follows: first, the central bank conducts 
an open market operation which determines the amount of reserves available in the system. It is 
assumed that the central bank is perfect in forecasting aggregate autonomous factors, and that 
aggregate liquidity conditions are precisely known to the market. Secondly, a fully efficient 
interbank market session takes place in which the overnight interest rate is determined. Finally, 
end of day clearance takes place, in which banks are subject to individual surprise cash-flows, 
such that they may be pushed into having to use either the borrowing or the deposit facility 
offered by the central bank. 
 
Let  be the reserves bank j chooses to hold (through dealing in the interbank market) at the 
beginning of the day. The bank is subsequently subject to a shock in its holdings of 
js
jε , taking its 
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end of day holdings to . The shocks are independently distributed across banks with jr
0]|[ =jj sE ε , . For each  j, 2]|[ jjj sVar σε = jj σε / has  cumulative density function F, with a 
mean of zero, variance of 1, and 5.0)0( =F . Let , and  denote the market rate, the rate 
of the borrowing facility, and the rate of the deposit facility, respectively. A risk-neutral bank will 
choose  to minimize expected costs C of refinancing, i.e. it will minimize 
Bii, Di
js
 
)]0,[max()]0,[min()( jjjDjjjBjj sEisEiissC εε +−+−=                            (1) 
 
The first order condition is 
 
0)/()())/(1)(( =−−+−−− jjBjjD sFiisFii σσ                                         (2) 
 
This implies desired overnight balances of 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−= −
DB
D
jj ii
iiFs 1σ                                                     (3) 
 
The market clearing overnight rate is the one that ensures that demand and supply of reserves 
match. Thus, we must have 
 
Rs
j
j =∑                                                          (4) 
 
 
where R is the aggregate reserves of banks with the central bank set at the beginning of the day. 
Substitution of (3) into (4) yields the solution: 
 
)( DB
j j
D ii
RFii −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ∑ σ                                                           (5) 
 
Thus by choosing R, for example through open market operations at the beginning of the day, the 
central bank can achieve any market interest rate within the corridor set by the two standing 
facilities. If R = 0, the market rate would be in the middle of the corridor [since F(0) = 1/2].  This 
would correspond to, e.g., the case of the ECB and the central banks of  Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada. If R is very large, then banks will tend to load off excess liquidity with probability 
close to one through the deposit facility at day-end, and the market price for overnight money 
should thus be close to .  If instead R has a large negative value, banks will be forced into the 
borrowing facility with high likelihood, and the interbank market will clear at a rate close to . 
Di
Bi
 
Incorporating a positive level or (daily) reserve requirements into this model is straightforward; 
just substitute R by R-RR (RR being reserve requirements) in equation (5).    
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4.2 A model with aggregate shocks an averaging 
 
In this model, the relationship between aggregate reserves and the interbank interest rate is not 
driven by liquidity shocks at the level of individual banks, but by an aggregate shock on 
autonomous factors. The central bank has an unbiased forecast E(A), with A = E(A) + ε .  Let F 
be the cumulative distribution function of ε . We first assume that there is no averaging and that 
required reserves each day are zero. At the beginning of the day, the central bank conducts an 
open market operation of M. Along the same lines as in the previous model, we have     
 
 ( ) )())(( DBD iiAEMFii −−−+=                                (6) 
 
This can also be written: 
 ( )[ ] ( ) [ ] )]"("[)"("))(())((1 shortPilongPiAEMFiAEMFii BDBD +=−−+−−−=          (7) 
 
In words, the overnight rate is a weighted average of the two standing facility rates, the weights 
being equal to the respective probabilities that the market is on aggregate “long” or “short” of 
funds at the end of the day. If M = E(A) and F(0)=0.5, the interbank rate will be in the middle of 
the corridor. 
 
We now introduce reserve requirements and averaging. As recourse to standing facilities at the 
end of the reserve maintenance period is then a matter of average reserves over the maintenance 
period being above or below required reserves, one simply needs to re-interpret all quantities as 
averages over this period. Thus let AM ,  be the averages over the reserve maintenance period of 
daily outstanding open market operations and autonomous factors, respectively. Thus, on any day 
t of the reserve maintenance period, we can write: 
 
))(()( , tRRFiiii AMtDBDt −−+=                                       (8) 
 
where  )(, AMtF −  is the conditional cumulative distribution function of AM −  as perceived by 
banks at the time of the money market session of day t, and RR(t) is the remaining average 
reserve requirement to be fulfilled from day t to the end of the reserve maintenance period for the 
banking sector as a whole. Note that now both M  and A  are random variables, since the open 
market operations after day t but before the end of the reserve maintenance period are not yet 
known.  
 
Consider as an illustration the following example from Bindseil (2004). First assume a three day 
reserve maintenance period with an open market operation (with three days maturity) only on the  
first day, as displayed in figure (1):  
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Start MP                     AF       end                              AF       end                      AF      recourse
                 Market    shock 1  day 1   Market          shock 2   day 2  Market    shock 3    SF    end of
     OMO   session 1                          session 2                                  session 3                         day 3&MP
 
 
Figure 1: A three days maintenance period with one open market operation 
 
 
For the sake of simplicity of notation, assume that . For the same reason, also assume 
that reserve requirements are zero, but that there are no limits to averaging. Banks can thus 
overdraft their account with the central bank, but have to fulfill zero reserve requirements on 
average over the three days period. Denote the random aggregate autonomous factors on each of 
the three days by 
0;1 == DB ii
321
~,~,~ ηηη , with realizations written without the tilde. Suppose these are iid 
N(0, ησ ). Assume that the central bank operates a neutral liquidity policy so that M is zero as 
well. Then the market interest rate on day 1 is 
 ( ) 2/13/0)03/))~~~(( 23211 =Φ=<++−= ησηηηPi      (9) 
 
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The market rate on day 1 will 
always be in the middle of the corridor as liquidity conditions are neutral. This changes on day 2, 
as market players observe the realisation of autonomous factors on day 1 (for instance the ECB 
publishes its relevant previous day’s balance sheet figures at 9:30 a.m.). The market interest rate 
on day 2 will thus be  
()Φ
 
 ( )2/)03/))~~(( 213212 ησηηηη Φ=<++−= Pi         (10)       
                               
 
The interest rate on day 3 will be: 
 ( )2213213 )()03/))~(( ησηηηηη +Φ=<++−= Pi        (11) 
 
The variance of the overnight rate increases day by day in the course of this reserve maintenance 
period, well in line with empirical evidence.  
 
Consider now the case in which the central bank conducts one operation with one-day maturity 
on each day of the maintenance period, before the respective market session. Assume the 
allotment policy 23121 ,;0 ηη === MMM , i.e. the central bank neutralises the autonomous factor 
shocks. It is easy to verify that this open market operation strategy allows a perfect stabilisation 
of interest rates within the reserve maintenance period, since in each market session, expectations 
with regard to the liquidity conditions prevailing at the end of the reserve maintenance period 
tend to be balanced.  
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The same result could also be achieved for the policy 21321 ,0;0 ηη +=== MMM , as long as the 
market is aware that this is what the central bank does. In this case, the market trusts that the 
central bank delays the correction of the first day’s autonomous factor shock. If the market is not 
aware of the central bank’s neutral policy, the market will have biased expectations after 
observing the shock on day 1, leading to an interbank rate that deviates from ½ on date 2. This 
example illustrates two key points. First, there may be open market policies that are distinct in 
terms of the distribution of liquidity supply across the reserve maintenance period, but that are 
equivalent in terms of the implied interest rate path, if they lead to the same accumulated liquidity 
supply. Second, it is important that the market has a clear picture of the central bank’s strategy of 
liquidity supply across different open market operations within the reserve maintenance period in 
order that the volatilities of interbank rates are minimized.      
 
It can be easily verified in these examples that, as implied by an unlimited averaging facility, the 
martingale property of short term interest rates holds, i.e. )()( 13121 IiEIiEi ==   and 
)( 232 IiEi = , where It is the information set of banks at date t. The intuition behind the 
martingale property is as follows. Assume for instance that )( 121 IiEi > . This would mean that 
any risk neutral bank should lower its total refinancing costs in the reserve maintenance period by 
lending on day 1 and by borrowing in the interbank market on day 2. On day 1, it would under-
fulfill its reserve requirement, but it would rebalance it on the next day. As all banks would 
attempt to do this, however, all banks would try to lend in the interbank market at the high rate of 
day 1 and all banks would try to borrow at the low rate on day 2. This however cannot be an 
equilibrium.  
 
 
4.3 Empirical studies 
The empirical literature on overnight interest rates has spotted various more or less important 
deviations from the martingale hypothesis, and tried to find explanation for them. Ho and 
Saunders (1985) focus on the possible risk aversion of banks. Campbell (1987) assumes that 
liquidity benefits of reserves vary across the days of the reserve maintenance period, for instance 
due to differing payment system activity. Transaction costs are introduced by e.g. Kopecky and 
Tucker (1993), Hamilton (1996), Clouse and Dow (1999) and Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2001). 
Limits to interbank trading have been mentioned by Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) and Hamilton 
(1996). Effects of payment systems are analyzed by Furfine (2000). Window dressing by banks is 
studied by Allen and Saunders (1992) for the US, and Bindseil, Würtz and Weller (2002).  
Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002) focus on volatility effects of operating procedures, confirming 
the increased end-of-day volatility also suggested in the simple model above. Gaspar, Perez-
Quiros, and Rodriguez-Mendizábal (2004) show that the end of day no-overdraft constraint alone 
is sufficient for a break-down of the martingale hypothesis and a tendency of short term rates to 
increase in the course of the reserve maintenance period. Further empirical models of short term 
interest rates in the euro area are Hartmann, Manna and Manzanares (2001), Angelini (2002) and 
Würtz (2003). Other estimates of the liquidity effect are Hayashi (2001) for Japan and Thornton 
(2001) for the US.  
 
The empirical evidence seems to confirm that a variety of factors beyond liquidity conditions and 
standing facility rates impact on actual overnight rates. However, the simple models developed in 
this Section provide a good understanding of how monetary policy implementation works and 
how the short term rate can be controlled.  
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5. Implications of monetary policy implementation for financial markets 
 
There are many ways for a central bank to steer short term rates and to provide liquidity.  These 
place different requirements on the central and commercial banks with respect to forecasting and 
managing liquidity conditions, dealing in securities, and managing collateral, and therefore have 
different implications for financial markets. In this section, we discuss some of these issues in the 
context of a simple example which focuses on standing facilities and open market operations. 
 
We consider four different implementation techniques, as illustrated in Table 7.  The techniques 
differ in their emphasis on standing facilities, the use of repo operations, or outright holdings of 
securities. Each of the four approaches is named for a central bank with a similar actual monetary 
policy implementation technique. For simplicity, in our example we ignore reserve requirements 
and assume that central bank liabilities consist EUR 100 billion of banknotes.   
  
 
Table 7: Central bank assets under four different implementation approaches, in billions of euro (liability: EUR 100 
billion of banknotes) 
 “Reichsbank” “Norwegian”  “US Fed”  “Eurosystem”  
Net recourse to borrowing facility 100 10 0* 0 
Repo operations 0 0 10 100 
Outright holdings of securities 0 90 90 0 
* Under the US Fed approach, there would actually be a very small expected net recourse to the borrowing facility  
 
 
a) The Reichsbank approach: 
All central bank funds are provided through recourse to a borrowing facility, the rate of which is 
set at the level of the target rate. The structural recourse to the borrowing facility pegs the short 
term market rates (see Reichsbank, 1900, and Reichsbank, 1925).  This approach was practiced 
by the German Reichsbank from 1876 until at least 1914.  While we assume that the borrowing 
facility is collateral based, the Reichsbank’s actual borrowing facility was a genuine discount 
facility in which eligible short term paper was sold to the Reichsbank at the initiative of 
counterparties. 
 
b) The Norwegian approach 
Under this approach, banks always need to take recourse to one standing facility, in our case to 
the borrowing facility (in contrast to the actual recourse to some kind of deposit facility in 
Norway, Indonesia, China, etc.).  Deterministic recourse to the borrowing facility pegs the short 
term interbank rate. However, in contrast to the Reichsbank approach, the recourse to the 
standing facility only covers a smaller part of the central bank assets, the rest of assets being 
outright holdings. Therefore the central bank has more freedom to determine the composition of 
its assets.   
 
c) The US Fed approach  
Recourse to the borrowing facility is stochastic, and the short term interest rate target is set below 
the borrowing facility rate (in practice, the difference is 100 bp).  There is no deposit facility. 
Most of the funds are provided through outright purchases. The Fed holds Treasury securities in 
proportion with their market capitalization, implying a portfolio duration of around 5 years. Fine 
tuning of liquidity is done via repos.  
 
d) The ECB approach 
Net recourse to the borrowing facility is stochastic. There is both a borrowing and a deposit 
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facility, which are 100 bp above and below the target rate, respectively.  Both the structural 
liquidity supply and day-to-day liquidity management takes place through repos against a wide 
range of eligible collateral.   
 
Table 8 summarizes these four techniques with respect to how they provide liquidity -- through 
outright holdings or collateralized loans, or repos – and how they control short term rates – 
through standing facilities or open market operations.  Below, we discuss the impact of these 
choices on financial markets. 
 
 
 
Table 8:Two key dimensions of choices for designing a monetary policy implementation approach 
                    Technique to control short term interest rates 
  Systematic recourse to SF*  Combination of  OMOs** and 
stochastic recourse to SFs  
 
Collateral based 
 
Reichsbank 
 
 
Eurosystem 
 
Structural 
liquidity 
provision Outright 
holdings based 
 
Norway 
 
 
US Fed 
          * SF = Standing facilities; ** OMO = Open market operations  
 
 
5.2 Efficiency of liquidity management for banks and for the central bank 
 
For a commercial bank, liquidity management is costly in that it requires forecasting its liquidity 
in- and outflows and trading in the money market. This might require analysts, traders, back 
office staff, management, etc. These costs do not feature in the models in Section~4, but can be 
important in practice. Banks face a tradeoff between investing resources into analysis and trading 
on the one side, and the costs of sub-optimal end of day liquidity positions on the other side.  
From this perspective, it is desirable to have an operational framework that minimizes the costs of 
liquidity management. 
 
For the central bank similar cost issues arise.  Forecasting the autonomous liquidity factors and 
conducting operations require staff for analysis, trading, and settlement. In contrast, recourse to 
standing facilities would appear to involve less costs for the central bank as it is undertaken by 
the counterparties. One could view the central bank as facing a potential tradeoff between the 
precision of interest rate control, on the one hand, and administrative costs, including forecasting 
autonomous factors, on the other. 
  
For the liquidity management of the central bank, approaches based on the systematic use of 
standing facilities (the two approaches on the left-hand side of table 8) appear more efficient.  
The Reichsbank approach in particular would seem to minimize costs as it requires minimal 
efforts on behalf of the central bank to forecast liquidity developments. The story seems to be 
similar for commercial banks.  
  
Costs of liquidity management might also be different in collateral versus outright holding based 
frameworks (the vertical dimension in table 8). Collateral based operations (operated as standing 
facilities or repo auctions) with a wide range of counterparties facilitate channelling liquidity 
directly to the counterparties in need of it. With outright operations based approaches, the 
liquidity has to be redistributed by the banking system itself, which would increase transaction 
costs. On the other hand, regularly turning over a substantial amount of the stock of liquidity 
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might involve costs that would be avoided under the outright operations based approach.  
 
5.3 Market neutrality in terms of relative prices of financial assets 
 
Choices with regard to the monetary policy implementation technique should avoid having 
distorting effects on the relative prices of financial assets.  This mainly refers to the vertical 
dimension in table 8, i.e. outright versus collateral based approaches. 
 
Due to the scale of central bank assets, outright purchase or sale operations can potentially 
influence relative asset prices. For instance, the Fed currently holds around USD 700 billion, all 
in Government securities. If the Fed decided to exchange some of its holdings to agency or 
mortgage backed securities, for example, this might well drive down the spreads of these 
securities relative to government securities. Since the central bank probably cannot hold the full 
“market portfolio”, any outright portfolio will to some extent impact market prices and will thus 
require difficult choices by the central bank. 
 
It is often said that one of the main advantages of reverse collateral based operations is that they 
do not distort securities prices, because the underlying assets’ ownership is not affected. This 
appears plausible, particularly if the list of eligible collateral is wide and haircuts are set fairly. 
But it is possible that there is a premium on securities that are eligible as collateral, since use in 
central bank operations as collateral is for many banks one of the reasons to hold securities. If a 
security is made ineligible, then some banks may want to substitute it with eligible ones, which 
may put pressure on prices. 
 
In subsection 5.5 we will identify some cases where eligibility of collateral seems to have 
influenced issuance and even legislative activities in the euro area.  There is currently a debate in 
the euro area in the context of the high deficits or debt ratios of some euro area Governments, 
such as those of Greece, Italy and Portugal. According to some critics, e.g. J. Fels of Morgan 
Stanley (Financial Times of 1 April 2005) and Buiter and Sibert (2005), the ECB, by accepting 
Government bonds from these countries on similar terms as Government bonds of euro area 
countries with a better fiscal position, would narrow down spreads between these different 
Government debt instruments and reduce incentives for Governments to improve their fiscal 
situation.13  
 
In conclusion, a market neutral operational framework for monetary policy implementation may 
                                                 
13 The treatment of different Government bonds by the Eurosystem is actually not the same in so far as the 
Eurosystem applies daily marking-to-market, such that a higher credit risk perceived by market participants 
and reflected in prices implies that a higher nominal amount of collateral needs to be provided.  As a 
solution to the problem they perceive, Buiter and Sibert (2005: 25-28) suggest inter alia that the 
Eurosystem should issue sufficient debt to establish a new risk free benchmark against which the credit risk 
in all public instruments would be priced. However, the (one year) probability of default of a AAA rated 
Government issuer (like the German Government, which currently provides the euro benchmark yield 
curve) is generally considered to be below one basis point (such a default has never occurred in history). In 
addition, the German government presently has an outstanding debt of around EUR 800 billion 
(approximately the length of the current Eurosystem balance sheet), which implies an exceptional liquidity. 
To match this liquidity would probably require similar issuance volumes by the Eurosystem. Buiter and 
Sibert propose to balance the debt issuance through "outright purchases of other eligible debt instruments", 
meaning that the Eurosystem would eventually hold significantly more credit risk than presently (where its 
balance sheet is much shorter and mainly based on collateralised operations), and would most likely distort 
financial market prices significantly more than now.    
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be hard to achieve. Collateral based systems arguably retain the advantage that they spare the 
central bank the need to decide which assets to purchase.  
 
 
5.4 Market neutrality with regard to the yield curve 
 
Another dimension of market neutrality is the effect on the yield curve. Here, a collateral based 
system appears to ensure market neutrality to a higher extent than an outright holdings based 
system, since the ownership of assets, and therefore returns and risks, remains with the banks. 
This is particularly so when the central bank does not restrict the maturity of instruments 
submitted by banks as collateral, while it obviously would have to choose when buying assets 
outright.  
 
Leaving longer term rates to be set in the market is arguably the efficient thing to do. However, 
many central banks have tried at some time in their history to directly influence longer term 
interest rates through monetary policy implementation.  But, as summarised in Bindseil (2004) 
(section 5.3),  the results have been disappointing. Nevertheless, considerations of direct yield 
curve control re-emerged recently not only in deflationary Japan, but also in the US after the stock 
market downturn in 2000. According to some observers, the Fed tried to “talk down” longer term 
interest rates by suggesting that there was deflation risk in the US as well. In a speech delivered in 
November 2002, Governor Ben Bernanke even suggested the active use of open market 
operations for that purpose, and explained that he would “personally prefer the Fed to begin 
announcing explicit ceilings for yields on longer-maturity treasury debt (say bonds maturing 
within the next two years). The Fed could enforce these interest-rate ceilings by committing to 
make unlimited purchases of securities up to two years from maturity at prices consistent with the 
targeted yields.” However, no such concrete measures have been taken by the Fed. 
 
5.5 Contribute to liquid and resilient money markets 
 
The central bank is normally the largest and most important player in the money market. It 
therefore also set standards which eventually influence the conventions and practice of money 
and collateral markets.  This can have influence on the liquidity of the markets and their 
resilience to financial shocks. A liquid and resilient money market would be one in which (i) 
banks have active trading relation with each other, such as to know and trust each other to a 
relatively high degree; (ii) ample collateral is available in the system (and efficient methods of 
collateral settlement), such that even in case that no relationship of mutual knowledge and trust is 
there to build upon, banks will be able to exchange funds.  
 
Technique of liquidity supply and interbank money market activity  
 
It has sometimes been argued that parts of the interbank market trading volumes are of a 
speculative nature, and would thus vanish if rate volatility would move close to zero. However, in 
the euro area or US markets for overnight funds, there is little volatility except towards the very 
end of the reserve maintenance period. Nevertheless, trading volumes do not tend to increase 
towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. This is consistent with the view that interbank 
activity is primarily driven by liquidity management. Hartmann and Valla (2007) provide a more 
detailed discussion of these issues, and of money markets in general. 
 
Central bankers often argue that with a deterministic aggregate recourse to one standing facility, 
and, accordingly, overnight rates always at or very close to the relevant standing facility rate, 
banks would have less incentives to try to trade funds in the interbank market. Can one quantify 
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this impact on the size of the overnight market? Take a very simplistic example with 10 banks, 
half of them being short by EUR 5 million and 5 being long EUR 4 million, such that a total 
recourse of EUR 5 million to the borrowing facility will have to occur. Under the ECB’s 
symmetric corridor approach and daily operations, the central bank would target through its open 
market operations a zero recourse, and would thus add EUR 5 million to the system. If this 
liquidity ends up equally with the banks which were previously short, then 5 are short by EUR 4 
million and 5 are long by EUR 4 million. In the absence of forecast errors and efficient markets, 
recourse to standing facilities will be zero and the interbank lending volume will be EUR 20 
million. Now assume that under the Norwegian approach, the initial situation is the intended one, 
i.e. a net recourse to the borrowing facility of EUR 5 million is what the central bank aims at to 
peg the market rate at the level of the borrowing facility rate. The trades needed to minimize 
refinancing costs to the banking system are now again lending of EUR 20 million from the 
surplus banks to the deficit banks (the rate traded should be marginally below the borrowing 
facility rate – if collateral is not scarce or credit risk is not an issue). Thus, the interbank lending 
volume would be identical to the symmetric corridor approach. In other words, the interbank 
overnight market would not collapse, and it would not even shrink, at least not in this example. 
 
What about moving further from the Norwegian to the Reichsbank approach, in which recourse to 
the borrowing facility would be much higher?  Under the Reichsbank approach, we would find 
the banks in our example in completely different situations.  For example, we could have five 
banks being short by EUR 14 million and five short by EUR 5 million. Each bank has 9 million 
less, reflecting that the EUR 90 million which were provided under the Norwegian approach 
through open market operations have to be covered under the Reichsbank approach through 
recourse to the borrowing facility. Now, all interbank money market activity will be substituted 
by recourse to the borrowing facility, whereby some banks will borrow EUR 14 million and the 
others EUR 5 million. Thus, we see that how monetary policy is implemented will impact on 
interbank activity.  A small or nonexistent interbank market could be achieved by adopting the 
Reichsbank approach.  An active interbank market could be achieved through either of the other 
approaches listed in table 8.  
 
Impact on debt issuance and collateral standards 
To the extent that the specification of monetary policy implementation techniques, including in 
particular the choice of securities for outright holdings and the list of eligible collateral, is not 
entirely market neutral (see section 5.3), it will have some impact on issuance activity and 
therefore at least indirectly also on the securities available in the interbank market for repos. 
Consider the following examples taken from the collateral-based case of the ECB.  
 
(1) Covered bonds like Pfandbriefe can be defined as full recourse debt instruments secured 
(covered) by collateral pools, namely mortgage assets and/or claims against public sector entities. 
They constitute “on balance sheet securitization” (ECB 2004b) and are typically AAA rated 
(Association of German Mortgage Banks 2004). While being originally a German specificity, 
covered bonds were, from the start of the euro in 1999 on, made eligible all over the euro area as 
collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy operations. This also contributed to increase their 
attractiveness sufficiently to have banking systems and legislators work hard on quickly 
establishing conventions and laws supporting Pfandbrief all over Europe. So-called Jumbo-
Pfandbriefe (which are Pfandbriefe with an issuance volume of at least EUR 1 billion) are also 
used to a growing extent in interbank repo markets. At the end of 2003, a total of EUR 1 trillion 
of covered bonds was outstanding in the euro area. 
 
(2) Asset backed securities (ABSs). Since 1999, ABSs were also eligible collateral for 
Eurosystem operations. The amount of outstanding ABSs has developed exceptionally in Europe 
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since then, with issue volumes reaching EUR 268 billion in 2003 (of which 80% are AAA rated – 
see ECB, 2004b)14. While other factors (Basle II, technological advancements) have certainly 
also played a major role, anecdotal evidence suggests that eligibility for Eurosystem operations 
gave a further push to the growth of the market. Even if ABSs are normally not used in interbank 
repo operations, the securitisation they imply means an increased liquidity per se, as something 
that could not be traded beforehand (all sorts of non-standardized claims) is made easily tradable, 
somehow standardised, and credit rated. This could contribute to the liquidity and resilience of 
financial markets. 
 
(3) Loans of banks to corporates: The ECB decided in 2004 that loans of banks to corporates 
would  become eligible collateral euro area wide (they were eligible only in four countries 
beforehand). This might to some extent reduce incentives for banks to create Pfandbrief style 
assets or ABSs with loans they will then be able to submit directly to the Eurosystem. The 
standards of credit assessment for loans submitted to the Eurosystem as collateral may gain some 
recognition in the market and help to make the market for loans more liquid.  
 
 
5.6 Optimal duration of central bank assets, risk allocation and the central bank’s risk-
return preferences 
 
In a collateral based system, the central bank is constrained to hold assets with limited duration, 
and it also takes little credit and spread risk (credit risk materialises only in case that both the 
counterparty and the collateral issuer default simultaneously; spread risk is addressed through 
haircuts). In other words, a collateral based system is one in which the central bank overall takes 
very little risks. As far as non-diversifiable risks are concerned, this implies that it leaves 
correspondingly more risks in the hands of the market.  
  
Can one say anything about the optimal duration of central bank assets? One might argue that if 
the economy as a whole tends to have longer term refinancing needs, then the central bank should 
also aim at providing longer term financing to avoid the need of a costly duration transformation 
by banks. On the other side one could argue that banks want to be flexible in their financing 
behaviour, and thus like to have short term liabilities towards the central bank, at least if they 
know that they can always refinance again at the central bank when the current refinancing 
matures. From the central bank’s perspective, one could also view the duration decision as being a 
mere investment problem: how much interest rate risk does the central bank want to take into its 
balance sheet, and what expected return does it want? Not being threatened by liquidity problems, 
and having a long term horizon as an investor, it would seem that the central bank should not be 
overly risk averse in the short run, and should probably not hold less interest rate risk in its 
balance sheet than the average investor, and thus end up with a portfolio duration not below 
around five years (a few of the underlying issues are discussed in Bindseil, Manzanares and 
Weller 2004). If a central bank concludes that it wants to hold assets with a duration of this order 
of magnitude, be it for investment or more comprehensive social considerations, it will be forced 
to hold a part of its assets in outright form, i.e. it cannot do so under a pure collateral based 
approach.  
 
With regard to the extent a central bank should take credit or spread risk in its balance sheet, one 
could argue that taking these risks always requires careful analysis, and that the central bank can 
                                                 
14 According to ECB 2004b: “Off-balance sheet term securitization did not take off in Europe until the late 
1990s. It has seen impressive growth rates since then and has now become an established asset class in the 
European fixed income markets”.  
 26
never be a competitive player in this field and should therefore leave such risk-taking to others. 
The opposite argument would be that any investor should take credit risk as part of a CAPM type 
of diversification, and that with limited analysis, important diversification benefits can be 
achieved. In practice, many central banks have chosen to not incur any non-necessary credit and 
spread risk in their monetary policy operations, but to define a part of their assets (be they 
domestic or foreign) as investment assets, where they go for partial diversification into such risk.    
 
It is difficult to draw a clear conclusions on the desirability of a higher duration of central bank 
assets and of the benefits from diversification into credit and spread risk. In any case, the outright 
approach is more flexible in this respect than the collateral based approach, as the latter constrains 
risks and related return perspectives. If one believes that the central bank should get into these 
risks, then a pure collateral based approach would not be optimal.   
 
 
6. Open market operation mechanisms 
 
We have seen that open market operations can be classified by whether they inject or remove 
liquidity and whether they do so through repos or outright purchases.  In this section, we will 
focus on the mechanisms themselves, taking the type of open market operation as given.  There 
are two broad types of mechanisms that are commonly used, namely, fixed rate tenders and 
variable rate tenders. Both types have been used by the ECB.  These different mechanisms can 
have different impacts on allocations across banks in the operations and therefore on the money 
markets.   We will focus on the case that the operation injects liquidity through a reverse repo, as 
is the case for the ECB. 
 
6.1 Fixed rate tenders (FRT) 
In a fixed rate tender, the central bank fixes the interest rate of the operation and invites eligible 
financial institutions to submit bids specifying how much they wish to transact at the announced 
rate.  The most common allocation rule is the pro-rata rule, where bidders receive a pro-rated 
share of the total amount the central bank wishes to provide.  If this amount is larger than the  
aggregate demand in the tender, bidders receive their demand in full. An alternative is the 100% 
rule, where bidders receive their demands in full.  
 
Fixed rate tenders with the pro-rata rule was used, for example, by the Bundesbank during the 
1980s and 1990s and the Eurosystem from January 1999 to June 2000. The Bank of England also 
uses fixed rate tenders. The 100% allotment variant was applied, for instance, by the Bundesbank 
in the 1950s and by the Bank of Finland in the years preceding 1999.   
 
 
6.2 Variable rate tenders (VRT) 
In variable rate tenders, the rates at which operations take place are determined by auction.  Here, 
the bids of the counterparties are interest rate-quantity pairs, specifying the marginal quantity that 
the bidder demands at the specified interest rate.  These bids can be organized into an aggregate 
demand curve.  The rate where aggregate demand equals the quantity the central bank wishes to 
inject is referred to as the stop-out, or marginal, rate. There are two main types of auctions; 
uniform and discriminatory.  In both types, bids above the stop-out rate are allocated in full; while 
bids at the stop-out rate are pro-rated.  In uniform auctions, all bidders pay the stop-out rate; 
while in discriminatory auctions, they pay the rate of their accepted bids.  
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As with fixed rate tenders, the central bank may pre-announce the quantity it wishes to transact or 
it may decide upon this after observing bids.  Since the end of June 2000, the ECB has used 
discriminatory auctions for all but some fine-tuning operations.  There is little supply uncertainty 
in the ECB’s operations.  The ECB has a liquidity neutral policy and announces the liquidity 
neutral amount shortly before its main weekly operations. For its monthly longer term operations, 
the ECB pre-announces the exact amount it will inject (15, 20, or 25 billion euros).  When the 
size of the operation is non-discretionary, as in the euro area, the stop-out rate is determined by 
the bids submitted by the counterparties and therefore does not serve a role in signaling 
information from the central bank to the markets.  
 
The choice of mechanism affects at least two important issues: (i) the rate counterparties must 
pay for central bank funds; and (ii) the allocation of central bank funds in the tender and therefore 
the activity and possibly the transactions rates in the interbank markets.  
 
Variable rate tenders are sometimes viewed as having two main advantages relative to fixed rate 
tenders. (i) Variable rate tenders allow banks to express their relative preferences for central bank 
funds through the bid price, thus possibly aiding a more efficient allocation. (ii) Variable rate 
tenders solve the problem of overbidding (see below) which can occur with fixed rate tenders.  
 
Fixed rate tenders are sometimes viewed as advantageous to variable rate tenders because: 
(i) Fixed rate tenders send a stronger signal regarding the central bank’s monetary policy stance. 
The idea is that there is an implicit commitment to steer the corresponding short term market rates 
to levels around the tender rate. (ii)  Bidding in fixed rate tenders is simpler than in variable rate 
tenders and therefore do not put less sophisticated bidders (e.g. smaller banks) at a disadvantage. 
 
6.3 Empirical comparison of fixed rate and variable rate tenders 
 
In this subsection, we will discuss the ECB’s experience with fixed rate and variable rate tenders.  
The ECB used fixed rate tenders for its main refinancing operations from its inception in January 
1999 to 20 June 2000.  Starting with the operation on 27 June 2000, the ECB has used 
discriminatory auctions.  The reason for the switch has mainly to do with the so-called 
overbidding problem that arose with the fixed rate tenders; that is, banks demanded substantially 
more than the liquidity neutral amount that the ECB aimed to inject and that banks needed to 
fulfill reserve requirements.  For example, in the tender held on 30 May 2000, banks received 
only 0.87% of their demand.  This translates into a bid-to-cover of approximately 115, relative to 
the realized tender size.15  
 
Very large and highly variable bid-to-cover ratios are considered to be a problem for two reasons.  
First, high bid-to-cover ratios mean that banks that have relatively small amounts of collateral 
might need to demand more in the tender than what they have collateral for.  If bidding turns out 
to be weak, such banks could find themselves short of collateral.  Thus, banks with relatively 
little collateral might be at a disadvantage in the tender.  This was viewed as a problem 
particularly because collateral was said to be unequally distributed across the euro area, with 
some countries being collateral rich and others being collateral poor. Second, highly variable bid-
to-cover ratios make tender allotments less predictable and therefore liquidity management more 
difficult. Discriminatory auctions were viewed as being able to solve the overbidding problem 
since banks now could increase the likelihood of awards simply by bidding higher on the interest 
rate dimension. 
                                                 
15 Overbidding is studied by Nautz and Oechssler (2003) and Bindseil (2005). See also  Ayuso and Repullo 
(2003), Välimäki (2003),  and Ewerhart et al (2005). 
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Table 9 provides some summary statistics under the fixed rate and variable rate regimes. 
 
Table 9: Comparison of Fixed Rate and Variable Rate Tenders Held by the ECB, Jan 1999-June 2001 
Panel a: Fixed Rate Tenders. #Obs = 76 
 Minimum 
bid rate  
(%) 
Bid-to-cover Swap 
rate 
(%) 
Swap 
spread 
(%) 
Volatility 
of swap rate  
(bp) 
Premium 
(rel to min bid rate) 
(bp) 
Discount 
(rel to swap 
rate) 
(bp) 
Mean 2.95 26.22 3.05 9.20 4.62 0.00 9.20 
St. error 0.05 2.92 0.06 1.20 0.17 0.00 1.20 
St. dev 0.46 25.47 0.51 10.47 1.46 0.00 10.47 
Minimum 2.50 1.00 2.51 -11.25 0.84 0.00 -11.25 
Maximum 4.25 114.94 4.34 41.25 10.62 0.00 41.25 
Panel b: Discriminatory Auctions (variable rate tender).  # Obs = 53 
Mean 4.60 2.06 4.68 8.19 4.29 6.52 1.67 
St. error 0.03 0.30 0.02 1.23 0.17 1.05 0.35 
St. dev 0.20 2.17 0.18 8.85 1.22 7.55 2.51 
Minimum 4.25 1.00 4.31 -5.50 1.18 0.15 -5.65 
Maximum 4.75 16.66 4.93 48.25 8.54 45.95 6.76 
Swap spread is the swap rate less the minimum bid rate. Premium is the average rate paid less the minimum 
bid rate.  Discount is the swap rate less the average rate paid.  Volatility of swap rate is calculated from the 
modified GARCH(1,1) model in Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002).  All variables are sampled on 
the tender days (swap rates are taken 15 minutes before the tender), with the exception of the volatility 
which is sampled the day before (which gives the conditional volatility for the tender day). Bid-to-cover is 
calculated with respect to the realized tender size. 
 
We see in Table 9 that bid-to-cover ratios indeed fall dramatically with the introduction of 
discriminatory auctions.  Under the fixed rate tender regime the average bid-to-cover ratio is 
26.22, while under the discriminatory auction regime it is 2.06.  Bid-to-cover ratios are also much 
less variable, their standard deviation fall from 25.47 under fixed rate tenders to 2.17 under 
discriminatory auctions. 
 
The table uses the two-week Eonia swap rate to benchmark the auction.  This is the rate of the 
fixed leg for a two week swap, where the floating leg pays the realized overnight rate (the 
EONIA).  The ECB’s operations during the sample period are for two-week money.  As an 
alternative to borrowing in the tender, a bank could borrow overnight over two weeks and hedge 
by entering an Eonia swap, paying the fixed leg. This would mean the bank would obtain the 
necessary liquidity at the swap rate.  Thus the swap rate can be viewed as the appropriate 
benchmark for the tenders.  The swap rate is also more liquid than other two week interbank 
rates. 
 
The swap spread is the swap rate less the tender rate (in the fixed rate tenders) or the minimum 
bid rate (in the discriminatory auctions).  This variable is the key to the overbidding phenomenon.  
 
We see from Table 9 that the swap spread averages to 9.20 basis points under the FRT period.  
Thus, banks could obtain funding at on average 9.20 bp cheaper in the tenders than in the 
interbank market, as we see in the discount column.  The reason is that the interbank (swap) rate 
reflects expectations that future tender rates will rise.  The tenders therefore provide an easy way 
for collateral rich banks to make money.   
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The swap spread does not decline much under the discriminatory auction regime, it averages to 
8.19 bp. But the auctions do not provide the same opportunity to make money as the fixed rate 
tenders.  We see that the discount averages to only 1.67 bp, which is well within the typical bid-
ask spread of around 3 bp. In the auctions, the huge discounts (or profits to bidders) are competed 
away.  Banks still participate because they need the good on offer, namely central bank funds, in 
order to satisfy reserve requirements.  We can see from the fact that the swap spread and the 
volatility of the swap spread is more or less the same under the FRT and VRT periods, that the 
reason for the reduced bid-to-cover ratios and discounts are the change of the mechanism, and not 
changes in other market conditions.  
 
The experience of the ECB also suggests that allocations in the tenders across banks can be very 
different under fixed rate and variable rate tenders.  In particular, in fixed rate tenders, collateral 
rich banks would appear to have an advantage.  This could potentially be a problem in that it 
could make squeezing more likely.   Squeezing could in theory occur in the money markets since 
banks have to fulfill reserve requirements.  What a bank does not obtain in the tender, it must 
obtain in the secondary market. An unbalanced  tender allocation increases the likelihood of short 
squeezing since it is becomes more likely that some banks may have market power. Thus the type 
of mechanism used in the operation can affect the orderliness of the secondary money markets.16
 
Besides overbidding, another problem that can arise is underbidding, whereby banks demand less 
in aggregate than the liquidity neutral amount; i.e., less than what they need to fulfill reserve 
requirements. Typically, underbidding occurs when banks expect that within the reserve 
maintenance period, the minimum bid (or fixed tender) rate will be reduced by the central bank, 
such as to allow for lower total refinancing costs by “backloading” the reserve fulfillment. 
Underbidding is costly for banks because it means they must use the ECB’s borrowing facility 
(marginal lending facility) to make up the shortfall, which comes at a penalty of 100 bp relative to 
the minimum bid rate in the tender.   Underbidding also disrupts the planned implementation of 
monetary policy.  If all tenders were consistently underbid, overnight rates would move up to the 
borrowing facility.  If this were expected to be persistent, the whole yield curve also would shift 
up.    
 
Underbidding has occurred in several instances.  In Table 9, a bid-to-cover of 1 means that the 
quantity allotted to bidders (realized auction size) equals the total demand by bidders.  These 
auctions were underbid relative to the liquidity neutral amount.  The reason underbidding happens 
is that rates are expected to fall.  Moreover, in most underbidding cases, the swap rate the 
morning of the tender is below the minimum bid rate (or tender rate), making the tenders an 
unattractive source of liquidity.  However, after an underbid tender, interbank rates tend to 
increase, as banks need to go to the borrowing facility.  
 
The ECB has solved the underbidding problem not by changing the mechanism17, but by 
matching reserve maintenance periods with meetings of its Governing Council. In particular, 
there is now only one Governing Council meeting at which interest rates can be changed during a 
reserve maintenance period, and interest rate changes become effective exactly at the beginning 
of the period. This means that bidders cannot expect to obtain cheaper funding later in the period.  
Thus they have no reason to abstain from obtaining funds in the auctions.  
                                                 
16 Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) and (2004) discuss short squeezing in fixed rate tenders and auctions, 
respectively. 
17 Linzert et al (2007) provide evidence of the smooth working of pure variable rate tenders in the ECB’s 
longer term refinancing operations. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has provided an overview of monetary policy implementation.  We have discussed the 
three elements of implementation, namely, the operational target, the framework, and liquidity 
management.   The operational target in most economies today is a short term rate.  We have 
discussed a variety of ways how the rate can be controlled, drawing on specific examples from 
Europe as well as the US, and discussed how monetary policy implementation can distort asset 
prices through the type of collateral that can be used in transactions with the central bank.  
Finally, we touched on how the type of mechanism that a central bank uses for its open market 
operations can affect the allocation of central bank funds across banks and thus the money 
markets. 
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